EU security sector reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina:Reform or resist? by Juncos , Ana E
                          Juncos , A. E. (2018). EU security sector reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina:
Reform or resist? Contemporary Security Policy, 39(1), 95-118.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2017.1391625
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
License (if available):
CC BY
Link to published version (if available):
10.1080/13523260.2017.1391625
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
This is the final published version of the article (version of record). It first appeared online via Taylor & Francis at
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2017.1391625 . Please refer to any applicable terms of
use of the publisher.
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published
version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fcsp20
Contemporary Security Policy
ISSN: 1352-3260 (Print) 1743-8764 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fcsp20
EU security sector reform in Bosnia and
Herzegovina: Reform or resist?
Ana E. Juncos
To cite this article: Ana E. Juncos (2018) EU security sector reform in Bosnia and
Herzegovina: Reform or resist?, Contemporary Security Policy, 39:1, 95-118, DOI:
10.1080/13523260.2017.1391625
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2017.1391625
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group
Published online: 05 Dec 2017.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 222
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Citing articles: 3 View citing articles 
EU security sector reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina:
Reform or resist?
Ana E. Juncos
School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK
ABSTRACT
Attempts to explain the failure to reform the security sectors in post-conflict
countries have often resorted to two sets of explanatory factors: international
and local factors. This article seeks to move from that unhelpful dichotomy to
an explanation linking both factors. Drawing on a Foucauldian approach and
the concept of “counter-conduct,” it examines the rationality and practices of
European Union (EU) governmentality and how governing technologies are
resisted and reversed by local elites involved in security sector reform (SSR).
Instead of understanding power and resistance as binary opposites, this
article argues that counter-conduct can be conceived as implicated in the
very relations of power that it seeks to resist. To tease out these relations, the
article analyzes the EU’s efforts in SSR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where it
identifies four forms of counter-conduct: upholding European standards, using
the local ownership trap, simulating reforms, and lowering the bar.
KEYWORDS European Union; security sector reform; counter-conduct; resistance; governmentality;
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Over the last two decades, security sector reform (SSR) programs have been
increasingly used in post-conflict situations, alongside other mechanisms, to
support the restoration of peace.1 SSR has thus become another tool in
post-conflict peacebuilding by helping with the (re)building of security
sector institutions based on the principles of democratic oversight, transpar-
ency, and good governance. The European Union (EU) has also resorted to
SSR to contribute to its objectives of fostering “peace and stability, inclusive
and sustainable development, state-building and democracy, the rule of law,
human rights and the principles of international law” (European Commission
& High Representative, 2016, p. 2).
This article examines the EU’s contribution to peacebuilding by focusing
on its SSR activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter Bosnia). While
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the EU has been present in the country since the 1990s and has heavily
invested in SSR since the early 2000s with the deployment of Common Secur-
ity and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations, as well as European
Commission-led activities, progress in the transformation of Bosnian security
sector organizations and rules has been slow (Bassuener, 2015; Weber, 2015).
This also mirrors more general assessments in the literature which note that
despite the growth of SSR programs worldwide, their effectiveness has been
limited (De Larrinaga & Doucet, 2015, p. 58; Schroeder & Chappuis, 2014,
p. 135; Sedra, 2017). In order to explain this conundrum, local perspectives
need to be brought back into the equation.
This article seeks to make a twofold contribution to the SSR literature.
Firstly, while there is a wealth of scholarship on SSR, one of the main weak-
ness of these studies is that they have largely adopted a top-down perspective.
In other words, in trying to explain the failures of SSR programs, the emphasis
has been on international strategies and practices, while neglecting local
agency and domestic politics (Schroeder & Chappuis, 2014, p. 136). Yet, an
increasing body of literature has explored the role of domestic actors in the
outcome of SSR, either by identifying how domestic actors are able to under-
mine or support international reform efforts, by showing how domestic struc-
tures shape the actual implementation of the reforms or the role of non-state
actors (see, for instance, Schroeder & Chappuis, 2014; Sedra, 2017; Valters,
Van Veen, & Denney, 2015). More attention has also been paid to the out-
comes of interactions between international and local actors in SSR, for
instance, as the outcome of a rational choice game (Berg, 2014).
While these are welcome developments, there remains an unhelpful
dualism in the literature which distinguishes between “international”
(liberal norms, external actors’ interests, lack of coherence of international
programs) and “local” factors (local politics, corruption, conflict legacies,
etc.). We see this problem also in the case of Bosnia, where some scholars
have sought to explain the slow progress of reforms by focusing on the role
of external actors (Aybet & Bieber, 2011; Collantes Celador, 2005; Muehl-
mann, 2008; Tolksdorf, 2014; Vetschera & Damian, 2006) and how these
initiatives have failed because of the lack of intra- or inter-institutional coher-
ence, lack of adequate capabilities and expertise, or lack of local ownership,
among others. Others have explained SSR in Bosnia as the outcome of internal
power games (Berg, 2014). This article seeks to move beyond this dualism by
seeking to explore how international and local dynamics are mutually inter-
connected and, in this way, undermine and reinforce each other. As will be
explained in the next section, a focus on “counter-conducts” also serves as
a corrective of previous analysis of EU intervention in Bosnia where local
authorities are just seen as passive recipients of EU governmentality (Chand-
ler, 2007, 2010).
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Secondly, most of the SSR literature tends to be under-theorized or, as
Peake, Scheye, and Hills (2008) put it, the SSR literature suffers from a
“benign analytical neglect” (p. vii; see also Jackson, 2011, p. 1804). Most
SSR studies have taken a functional or problem-solving approach focusing
on the evaluation of successes and failures (Schroeder & Chappuis, 2014,
pp. 133–134). By doing so, not only have they implicitly supported the nor-
mative model underpinning the liberal peace, but they have also neglected
the analysis of power relations in the context of SSR programs. A new gener-
ation of SSR scholarship is increasingly concerned with theorizing SSR pro-
cesses and outcomes by drawing on the literature on state-building and the
liberal peace, including debates about hybrid security governance (Schroeder,
Chappuis, & Kocak, 2014) and limited statehood (Koehler & Gosztonyi, 2014)
which have challenged Weberian notions of the state (Hills, 2014; Sedra,
2017). Moreover, SSR has been theorized from different perspectives, from
sociological approaches (Blaustein, 2014) to organizational theory (Schroeder
et al., 2014) to Foucauldian, and postcolonial studies (Eriksson Baaz & Stern,
2017). Yet, only a handful of SSR studies have examined resistance (e.g.,
Lemay-Hébert, 2014; Rayroux & Wilén, 2014; Vandemoortele, 2012). Even
in these cases, they have not moved beyond the power/resistance dichotomy
and have failed to note how resistance is linked to power and how it can sim-
ultaneously undermine and reinforce domination practices.
Drawing on a Foucauldian approach, this article seeks to contribute to this
new generation of SSR literature by providing a better understanding of inter-
national–local dynamics; one which understands SSR as an expression of
broader neoliberal rationalities and resistance as a form of counter-conduct
—understood as the struggle of “how not to be governed like that” (Foucault,
2007a, p. 44). The article asks, firstly, how have EU SSR programs in Bosnia
been rationalized and what technologies have been deployed to support this
rationality? And secondly, how have these initiatives been adapted or resisted
by local actors? The article argues that the prevalent form of rationality of EU
SSR in Bosnia is one that seeks to put the country in its path to “recovery” and
toward becoming a “capable state.” As it will be shown, this rationality is
underpinned by “European” liberal values and the principles of gradualism
and local ownership. EU SSR initiatives have, however, been resisted at the
local level through different expressions of counter-conduct. Interestingly,
these counter-conducts have drawn on the same EU discourses (European
standards, gradualism, local ownership), underlining the complex nature of
power relations in peacebuilding contexts, where resistance both challenges
but also reinforces domineering power.
The methodology of this article is based on documentary analysis and
qualitative interviews. The analysis of counter-conducts draws first on the
examination of EU official documents (European Commission reports)
setting out the technocratic and gradualist approach to Bosnia’s accession
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to the EU. This is complemented with 25 semi-structured qualitative inter-
views conducted in Brussels, Sarajevo, and Mostar in 2005, 2007, and 2016
with EU officials, Bosnian officials, and representatives from civil society
organizations. The long timeframe of the interviews allows to take notice of
the changes in EU–Bosnia relations over the last decade, with the increasing
deadlock over police reform, constitutional reform, and defense reform. The
interviews were coded to maintain the anonymity of the interviewees.
The article proceeds as follows. After discussing the EU’s peacebuilding
intervention in Bosnia, it introduces a Foucauldian perspective on resistance.
Then, it moves to examining EU SSR as governmentality to identify its ration-
ality and techniques. The bulk of the article illustrates the ways in which local
actors have deployed different forms of counter-conduct. Four prominent
forms of counter-conduct have been inductively identified based on the
fieldwork: upholding European standards, using the local ownership trap,
simulating reforms, and lowering the bar. By adopting these forms of
counter-conduct, local actors have worked within EU SSR governmentality
to both undermine and reinforce the EU’s discourses and practices.
EU peacebuilding and resistance: A Foucauldian approach
The issue of resistance has long been a concern in peacebuilding studies (see
also Ejdus & Juncos, 2018). Most of this work has been influenced by Scott’s
(1985, 1989) seminal work on “infrapolitics,” a form of everyday resistance
that is often hidden and rarely coordinated, but can undermine repressive
regimes in the longer term. In Scott’s (1989) words,
just as millions of anthozoan polyps create, willy-nilly, a coral reef, thousands
upon thousands of petty acts of insubordination and evasion create a political
and economic barrier reef of their own. And whenever… the ship of state runs
aground on such a reef, attention is typically directed to the shipwreck itself and
not the vast aggregation of actions which make it possible. (p. 49)
Similarly, de Certeau (1984) explains how resistance can take place through
the practices of everyday life and how ordinary people might be able to trans-
form existing rules and practices. The notion of everyday resistance has been
further developed in peacebuilding studies to examine how local agency has
resisted international peacebuilding efforts (Chandler, 2013; Mac Ginty,
2010; Richmond, 2010). In other words, agents can subvert an unjust
system without overtly rejecting it. In the words of Richmond (2011), with
everyday resistance, “[p]ower is not met head on… but instead is subtly cir-
cumvented and set off course” (p. 428).
It is also possible to observe instances where local actors cooperate, while
rejecting, resisting, or adapting other aspects of the liberal peace. This adap-
tation of peacebuilding initiatives results in what Mac Ginty (2010) refers to as
98 A. E. JUNCOS
a “hybridized peace, that is in constant flux, as different actors and processes
cooperate and compete on different issue agendas” (p. 397). This hybrid peace
does not entail the end of the hegemonic liberal peace project, but it might
facilitate its transformation into a form of governance which resonates
more closely with local contexts and the everyday and that it has the potential
to re-politicize peacebuilding. In the context of EU peacebuilding in Bosnia,
for example, Kappler and Richmond (2011) refer to these processes of “peace-
building as resistance” in terms of “locally resonant processes by which local
actors develop their own peacebuilding strategies that run parallel to or
impede the [EU Peacebuilding Framework] approach” (p. 273). For their
part, Björkdahl and Höglund (2013) refer to “friction” as a way “to capture
and analyse the conflictual dimensions of global-local encounters” (p. 289),
identifying a number of potential responses—compliance, adoption, adap-
tation, co-option, resistance, and rejection—which might arise from these
encounters between global and local actors. While both the concepts of every-
day resistance and friction are productive in the sense that they foresee new
realities emerging from those interactions, they still tend to understand
power and resistance in binary terms, locating them at opposing poles, and
embodied in particular actors. A Foucauldian perspective to resistance chal-
lenges these assumptions.
The starting point here is Michel Foucault’s notion of governmentality. In
contrast to sovereignty, governmentality is defined as the “conduct of con-
ducts” and it is about “disposing things” and “employing tactics” (Sending
& Neumann, 2006, p. 656). Governmentality appears as a new form of gov-
ernment that takes populations as its main target, political economy as its
main form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as the main technical
means at its disposal (Foucault, 2007b, p. 108). Liberal governmentality
works in indirect ways by seeking to govern through consent, self-regulation,
and responsibilization of the subject rather than direct imposition.
There has been a tendency in the governmentality literature to create a
dichotomy between those governing and the subjects of governance, allowing
little room for agency—with subjects appearing as passive objects of liberal
governmentality (Malmvig, 2014, p. 296). In this vein, Chandler’s (2007) dis-
cussion of EU peacebuilding in Bosnia puts forward a view where neoliberal
governmentality seems all-oppressing and unstoppable. This view fails to
attribute agency to those resisting EU peacebuilding through counter-con-
ducts. Yet, in one of his most well-known quotes, Foucault (1978) claims
that “where there is power, there is resistance” (pp. 95–96). In this vein,
power and resistance should not be considered as two opposing poles, as
cooptation or confrontation, but as mutually constitutive (Death, 2010,
2011). Therefore, Foucault (2007b) prefers the term “counter-conduct,”
meaning the “struggle against the processes implemented for conducting
others” (p. 201). This is a struggle about “how not to be governed like that,
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by that, in the name of those principles, with such and such an objective in
mind and by means of such procedures, not like that, not for that, not by
them” (Foucault, 2007a, p. 44). These forms of counter-conduct can be
overt, but more often than not, they are hidden, invisible.
From this perspective, the quest for a pure emancipatory form of resistance
is futile—as those that resist do not cease to be governed—but at the same
time, power is also not an absolute as there is a possibility for agency to be
enacted to shape the way in which we are governed. Far from being a total
rejection of government, it is about “the art of not being governed quite so
much” (Foucault, 2007a, p. 44). Hence, rather than taking us “beyond govern-
ment” (Rose, 1999, p. 281), counter-conducts are already present within gov-
ernment (Foucault, 2007b, p. 357). Counter-conduct is thus implicated within
and relies upon the power relations and techniques that it opposes. In his
work, Foucault did not identify different “ideal” types of counter-conduct
as those will vary depending on the “prevailing discourses” and particular
“regimes of truth” which are made possible in particular contexts. One can
only identify particular forms of counter-conducts, as in the case of this
article, inductively from fieldwork.
In sum, the notion of counter-conduct allows us to move away from con-
ceiving power relations in binary terms to a much more complex and dynamic
understanding, where resistance can both reinforce and undermine power
(Death, 2010, p. 235; Odysseos, Death, & Malmvig, 2016). For instance, in
Death’s (2011) account of protests in South Africa, he argues that some of
these protesters’ discourses and practices worked to reinforce the view that
state representatives were the “proper target and focus of progressive politics”
(p. 431), reinforcing the status quo. Similar analyses have been developed in
the literature on the role of the EU in its neighborhood. For instance, Malmvig
(2014) has used this framework to examine the EU’s democracy promotion
efforts in the Arab world. Cebeci (2016) has similarly studied how the
Turkish ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has countered the
EU’s quest for political reform through overt and covert ways of resistance
whilst pursuing the discourse and practices of accession to the EU. The
study of counter-conducts also seems particularly relevant in analyzing SSR
activities by the EU as it allows us to transcend the dichotomies between
the “international” and the “local,” between domineering power and
agency. But before examining forms of resistance in the case of Bosnia, one
needs to establish whether EU SSR programs constitute a form of governmen-
tality: What are the purposes and goals of these programs, their techniques,
and what is the problématique that they seek to solve (see Dean, 1999)?
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EU SSR as governmentality
As with other post-communist countries, the Bosnian security sector has suf-
fered from problems of weak democratic oversight, accountability, and trans-
parency. In the case of Bosnia, these problems have been compounded by the
complexity of the governance structure, the number of veto players in the
country, and the legacies of war. Many members of the security forces have
been suspected of participating in committing war crimes or war-racketeering
activities. Police forces have also generally been perceived as political instru-
ments in the service of their respective ethnic groups.
The EU became active in SSR in Bosnia in the early 2000s. Following the
withdrawal of the UN police mission, the EU established a Police Mission
(EUPM) in 2003. When the NATO military operation came to an end, the
EU launched its military operation EUFOR Althea in 2004. Furthermore, in
addition to the permanent delegation of the European Commission, the EU
established an EU Special Representative (EUSR) in 2002. In a “double-
hatting” arrangement, this EUSR would also be at the same time the inter-
national High Representative to Bosnia. Transforming Bosnia’s security
sector became quickly a key EU objective through the EU’s involvement in
police reform and assistance with defense reform (the later under the leader-
ship of NATO).
A governmentality perspective can shed light when it comes to under-
standing how EU SSR initiatives have been rationalized and justified (Merlin-
gen, 2011). According to de Larrinaga and Doucet (2015, pp. 63–64), it is
possible to understand the reform of the security sector in post-conflict con-
texts as an extension of neoliberal governmentality via international govern-
ance structures. The growth of SSR programs has thus resulted in the creation
of a “liberal assemblage of knowledge and security governance for societies
and spaces marked for post-conflict reconstruction” (de Larrinaga &
Doucet, 2015, p. 64). The particular ways of knowing (rationalities) at the
heart of SSR programs work through a pathologization of targeted countries.
In this view, SSR programs present a language of pathology (preventing
“relapse” into conflict; supporting “recovery” of fragile states). Yet, SSR is
not only aiming to address those specific “ills,” but it also works to produce
particular subjectivities by making states become responsible actors in line
with the model of the liberal (capable) state. In the same way as medicine
is not only confined to a technology curing ills, but it also generates knowl-
edge about the “healthy man” and the “model man,” SSR is not limited to pro-
viding recipes for improving the state security apparatus, but more generally it
propagates a discourse of the “model state” as the liberal state (de Larrinaga &
Doucet, 2015, pp. 59–60).
In a similar vein, Jackson (2011) argues that SSR “seeks to construct states
that are ‘capable’ in a liberal sense, i.e. by providing good governance,
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democracy and security” (p. 1817). This also shows how the SSR enterprise is
deeply normative by seeking to promote particular international and, in the
case of Bosnia, European standards. Jackson (2011) adds that by following
a liberal peace agenda, SSR contributes to a redefinition of state sovereignty
“from being an international absolute to a variable one based on state capacity
or a state being sovereign only in so far as it is capable of carrying out certain
functions” (p. 1818). Implicit in this understanding is also the idea that there
is no end point to this “becoming a capable state,” that this is always a matter
of degrees, of “progress,” a gradual process (on gradualism, see also Malmvig,
2014). Technologies of power such as monitoring and benchmarking help in
determining how much progress has been achieved (e.g., in the annual EU
Enlargement Reports). Similarly, by applying these different benchmarking,
peer review, and monitoring techniques, EU SSR maintains a disguise of
“scientific validity” (Pogodda, Richmond, Tocci, Mac Ginty, & Vogel, 2014,
p. 230).
Yet, in line with a liberal problématique of power, this road to recovery and
toward becoming a “capable state” must be self-initiated, hence the language
of local ownership and partnership (de Larrinaga & Doucet, 2015, p. 61). As
explained by Joseph (2013),
This is a politics that presents itself in terms of persuasion rather than coer-
cion, enablement rather than constraint, partnership rather than command.
This is a governmentality that works from a distance through policy sugges-
tion backed up with a complex array of techniques of monitoring and assess-
ment. It works through the idea that partners are free to take the lead, but
also gently persuades them to “do the right thing”. This means responsible
ownership that engages with the right partners and implements the right
policies. (p. 289)
However, in practice, these self-initiated reforms in the form of local or
national ownership are limited to “an exercise of emulating proper behav-
iour according to a pre-determined model of security governance that is
deemed most effective in providing for the population’s security” (de Lar-
rinaga & Doucet, 2015, p. 61). In the case of EU SSR initiatives in Bosnia,
they have adopted mainly a “top-down” approach (Moore, 2014), meaning
that the EU has focused on state-level and elite-level interventions under
the assumption that these reforms will then spill over to other levels of
society.
In sum, one can argue that, in the case of Bosnia, EU SSR governmentality
operates through ideas of self-regulation, but in a manner that produces and
regulates subjects and their conducts through rationalities and technologies of
power (Chandler, 2007, 2010; Merlingen & Ostrauskaite, 2006). The political
rationality of EU SSR constitutes Bosnia as a state in need of intervention to
ensure that it one day becomes a “capable state.” This “model” state is one that
follows European (liberal) principles, although this is to be done gradually and
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seemingly respecting local ownership. In the next section, the article shows
how EU governing technologies are resisted and countered by Bosnian
elites involved in SSR by working within the EU’s discourses and practices,
namely, the notion of European standards, local ownership, and the gradual-
ism of the reform process.
Resisting EU governmentality in Bosnia: Four forms of
counter-conduct
While there are some forms of overt resistance (ethnic parties leaving nego-
tiations or voting against EU-sponsored proposals), this article brings atten-
tion to those forms of counter-conduct that are subtle, hidden, and which
work inside the liberal logic (Scott, 1990). In Malmvig’s (2014) words, “they
resist in part by working inside European technologies and discourses—resist-
ing not by being ‘against,’ but by making use of the liberalist discourse”
(p. 296) of European principles, ownership, and gradualism deployed by
the EU’s governmentality. As stated by one of the interviewees (#12), “We
haven’t seen active resistance [from local actors]. They don’t tell you to
your face that something’s not going to happen. They want the kudos of
working with externals.” Yet, while Bosnia, like other candidate and potential
candidates, officially accepts the EU’s conditionality in the area of rule of law,
this conditionality is challenged through “subtle” mechanisms (Cebeci, 2016,
p. 122). Such mechanisms in the case of Bosnia include resorting to EU stan-
dards and values, deploying the rhetoric of local ownership, simulating
reforms, and lowering the bar when it comes to the implementation of specific
reforms.
Upholding European standards
As mentioned above, EU SSR in Bosnia is underpinned by a normativity
which draws on so-called European and international standards or principles
(also sometimes referred to as “best practices” in the official jargon). In the
words of an EU official working in Bosnia (interview #13), their role involves
developing “strategies and policies that not only work for Bosnia, but are also
compliant with international and EU standards” and no matter how long the
negotiation of new initiatives and programs take, the locals eventually accept
“the EU standard as the principled way forward.” These standards follow the
principles of civilian democratic control of the monopoly over the use of force
and accountability and transparency of the security forces (Schroeder et al.,
2014, pp. 214–215). In the case of police and defense reform in Bosnia, in
addition to these general SSR conditions, the EU focuses on the need to estab-
lish a functional state. In Bosnia, this is understood as requiring centralized
armed and police forces, thereby unifying those of the two existing political
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entities (Republika Sprska and the Bosniak-Croat Federation of Bosnian
Herzegovina).
Yet, beyond these general principles, it is very difficult to pin down the spe-
cifics of such standards or practices (even for those working in the field),
especially given the diversity of security practices across different states and
even within the EU member states. This is compounded by the fact that
there are no common EU rules (acquis communautaire) on police and
defense reform. The EU has become involved in SSR only relatively recently
and in the area of defense reform, the EU remains a very limited actor clearly
secondary to NATO. As a result, European standards remain a rather vague
and politicized concept which has been used by local pro-European and pro-
democracy activists to put pressure on their governments to reform and Eur-
opeanize and, alternatively, by the locals to counter EU reform processes.
The later approach was particularly evident in the case of police reform.
The police reform process started in 2005 and it became one of the main
objectives of the EU in Bosnia at the time. The EU even made it a condition
before signing the important Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA)
between the EU and Bosnia (Juncos, 2011). The lack of agreement over the
centralization of the police forces and the reorganization of the country’s
police forces on the basis of functional criteria rather than ethnic ones (includ-
ing the crossing of the Inter-Entity Boundary Line by the police forces) led to a
political stalemate between the Bosnian political elites and the EU negotiators
over the period 2005–2007. This stalemate was only overcome by the Mostar
Agreement of October 2007, according to which all Bosnian political parties
agreed on the substance of the reform and an implementation plan. This
agreement paved the way for the adoption of two new laws on police restruc-
turing (and the creation of new state-level police structures) which led even-
tually to the signature of the SAA between the EU and Bosnia in June 2008.
One of the main reasons behind the 2005–2007 stalemate was the fact that
Bosnian Serbs rejected the so-called three “European principles”: (1) all legisla-
tive and budgetary competences vested at state level; (2) no political interference
with operational policing; and (3) functional police areas determined by tech-
nical policing criteria (European Commission, 2006, p. 48). Bosnian Serbs
argued that these principles were not in line with actual European standards
and practices. Indeed, nothing is said in the EU rulebook about a centralized
state-level police, exclusive competences for the state, or that police regions
should be determined by technical policing criteria. This created enormous pro-
blems for the European Commission which could not justify the three criteria
(see Juncos, 2011). For their part, local politicians in Bosnia also referred to the
diversity of models in the various EU member states to reject the imposition of
these principles. Bosnian Serbs were eager to note inconsistencies with Euro-
pean standards and practices to justify resistance against EU conditionality.
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For instance, President of Republika Srpska Dragan Čavić claimed that the con-
ditions were completely unrelated to the EU:
Obviously, [international High Representative and EUSR] Ashdown called [EU
Commissioner] Chris Patten and asked him to make police reform a criterion
for the entry of [Bosnia] into the EU. The criteria of the police reform were
completely designed by the [Office of the High Representative] and had
nothing to do with the EU as such. (As cited in Lindvall, 2009, p. 113, see
also p. 114)
By adopting such strategies, local actors can also make use of the Europeanist
discourses to portray themselves as “European” versus a non-European
“other” (Jeffrey, 2008). In fact, Jeffrey (2008) has shown that Bosnian Serbs
justify the defense of the Republika Sprska’s sovereignty and their opposition
to EU conditions as “the ‘authentic’ defence of European values against the
neoliberal interventions made in the name of the EU” (p. 439). In particular,
Bosnian Serbs see themselves as protecting a Christian European identity vis-
à-vis more cosmopolitan and multicultural visions of Europe.
Interestingly, the European Commission seems to have learned from this
failed process by adapting its discourse—showing how counter-conducts
both undermine and reinforce governmentality. According to a Commission
official (interview #3), as part of the rule of law seminars organized with EU
candidate countries to share member state practices, now they “don’t talk of
best practices but good practices, also because it doesn’t matter if there are
differences in these practices between countries as long as they are good
practices.”
The Bosnian Serbs have also used a complementary strategy, arguing that
the implementation of the police reform (or any other reforms in the security
and justice sectors requiring a centralization of authority) would run against
the constitutional framework established by the Dayton Peace Agreement
(Vandemoortele, 2012, p. 213). In particular, Bosnian Serbs would complain
that the different reforms promoted by the EU and the Office of the High
Representative would undermine or even threaten the existence of Republika
Srpska by fostering state centralization (Lindvall, 2009, p. 112; see also Tolks-
dorf, 2014, p. 65). Although the Commission was cautious not to support a
particular model, EU integration was increasingly seen as a process of
strengthening of state-level institutions and some degree of centralization.
Bosnian Serbs could also point to EU official documents to confirm their
worst fears. As acknowledged by the European Commission (2002) in its
first annual report on the stabilization and association process for the
Western Balkans, “[i]n some cases, the goal of sustainability and integration
into European structures may mean that Entity powers may have to be
ceded to the State” (p. 17). Yet, the European Commission (2002) sought to
alleviate Bosnian Serb concerns by pointing out that “Republika Srpska in
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particular must consider that a strong state is compatible with a strong Entity,
indeed that the former is a prerequisite of the latter” (p. 17). This also high-
lights that as far as EU integration is concerned, different positions are held by
different ethnic groups depending on the issues and depending on how the
process is perceived to affect them (interview #16). In this regard, police
reform was seen as “a battle ground” between different ethnic groups and
between the locals and the international community (interview #9). Hence,
resistance by the local is not uniform nor does it always take the same form
as it depends on who “the local” is.
The local ownership trap
As mentioned before, local ownership has become a key principle in EU SSR
(see also Ejdus, 2018). For instance, the new EU Framework on SSR states
that:
Reform efforts will be effective and sustainable only if they are rooted in a coun-
try’s institutions (including through budgetary commitment), owned by
national security and justice actors, and considered legitimate by society as a
whole. This means that national actors should steer the process and take
overall responsibility for the results of interventions, with external partners pro-
viding advice and support. (European Commission & High Representative,
2016, pp. 7–8)
Time and again, the European Commission has sought to emphasize the idea of
partnership and local ownership as guiding principles in Bosnia’s path toward
EU membership: “National and Entity sustainability can only be built on the
basis of full BiH’s ownership of the reform process” (European Commission,
2002, p. 17). In line with previous enlargement processes in Central and
Eastern Europe, the candidate and potential candidate countries—such as
Bosnia—had to remain in control of the process. In the words of one Commis-
sion ofﬁcial (interview #1), the European Commission is
against this imposition because we see the negative consequences of the “inten-
sive care” that Bosnia receives, especially in terms of the de-responsibilization
of the local authorities. This intensive intervention, with the Bonn powers
[which give the High Representative extensive executive powers], has contrib-
uted to the reform process, but it has a negative impact on the responsibility of
the local authorities.
From this perspective, the defense and police reforms in Bosnia symbolized
a shift in the international approach to state-building by moving from the use
of the Bonn powers by the High Representative to locally owned reforms that
would have paved the way to eventual EU and NATO membership. In other
words, this was seen as a move “from Dayton to Brussels” (Ashdown, 2005).
As stated by an interviewee (#9), “imposition is no longer an option in that
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sense. And anything coming from outside in terms of security sector reform is
very much resisted.” A rhetorical commitment to local ownership was par-
ticularly ingrained in the European Commission. As put in a report funded
by the Commission (ICMPD and TC Team Consult, 2004), in the case of
the police reform, whatever the organizational structure adopted, the most
important issue was to ensure political consensus and local ownership of
the reform: “Local ownership is more important than a perfect solution on
paper” (p. 135).
Interestingly, this language of local ownership was then appropriated by
the local partners, which complained about the attempts to pressurize them
into an agreement, complained about “arm twisting” by the Office of the
High Representative and the EUSR, and the use of conditionality by the Euro-
pean Commission (interview #16). Taking the principle of local ownership to
its natural conclusion also meant that the EU (and the Office of the High
Representative) had to accept that the three European principles were not
set in stone, but could be modified on the basis of a compromise at the
local level (see also section on lowering the bar), and the use of (or threat
of) a veto power by the local actors when the reforms were seen as damaging
to their interests (which both the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosniaks used during
the negotiations on police reforms).
However, it is also worth pointing to the fact that for most EU and inter-
national officials the understanding of local ownership was limited to the
implementation of the reforms rather than the initiation and design of
those reforms. After reforms had been initiated and the main parameters
agreed upon by the local actors at the Police Restructuring Directorate, it
was up to the state and entity governments to implement these reforms (Van-
demoortele, 2012, p. 211). Even when it came to the implementation of the
reforms, there was also a reticence from the internationals to “let go.”
Hence, a former Head of the Delegation of the European Commission to
Bosnia claimed that “the EU is very keen to have countries taking full owner-
ship” of police missions, but it had done little to facilitate such ownership (as
cited in Moore, 2014, p. 297). This problem is also complicated by the fact that
the High Representative and the Bonn powers remain in place in Bosnia and
that many Bosnian policy-makers still rely too much on external assistance to
design their own strategies and programs. For example, a European Commis-
sion official (interview #4) lamented the fact that in 2016 the Bosnian govern-
ment decided to draft a human rights strategy, but then contacted the
Commission to see if they could pay and recommend an international
expert. In sum, the discourse of local ownership has been used by the EU
to support and adapt its strategy in Bosnia, while the locals have used it to
resist attempts to impose top-down reforms.
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Simulating progress
Another form of counter-conduct in the case of Bosnia is that of simulating
progress. As with the previous forms of resistance, in this case simulation
operates within the EU’s discourses and technologies by utilizing the dis-
course of gradualism and progress that characterizes the EU’s engagement
with its neighbors. In the case of EU democracy promotion policies, for
instance, Malmvig (2014) argues that
[s]ince political reform is presumed to be an incremental, slow and uneven
process, European reform managers have immense difficulties establishing if
a given Arab government is in the process of genuinely undertaking reform
or if they are, in fact, resisting governing technologies by pretending to under-
take reform. (p. 305)
Similarly, the ambiguity inherent in the gradual process of enlargement and
the vague nature of conditionality in the area of SSR (see section on European
principles) allow Bosnian policy-makers to simulate reforms or at the best of
times to apply them in a selective manner (see also Cebeci, 2016; Malmvig,
2014). For instance, the annual European Commission progress reports
tend to refer to more vague terms such as “meaningful progress” or “some
progress,” while avoiding where possible references to the lack of progress
or no progress (see, for instance, European Commission, 2016). Not only
are EU reforms vague, they are also interpreted differently by each of the
ethnic parties. As argued by one interviewee (#5), EU reforms
have been ineffective due to how they are received here. The EU comes with its
criteria and it gives regulations required for EU integration—the “written com-
mitment” whereby leaders committed to the path of structural reforms, for
example. But each political leader who signed the “written commitment” rep-
resented a different ethnicity, and therefore a different understanding of what
the commitment meant.
As several of the interviewees noted, despite the EU’s efforts in the area of
policing, the reform that took place was “not meaningful—it was just cos-
metic” (interview #6). The police forces in Bosnia are still divided along
ethnic lines, and politicized. The Directorate for Coordination of Police
Bodies of Bosnia and Herzegovina has not played any meaningful role in
increasing coordination among the different police forces. What is more, it
would seem that the levels of fragmentation and politicization have even
increased in recent years, with the entities trying to roll back reforms that
had been put in place by the EUPM (Weber, 2015). The EU has faced
similar problems in other areas. For instance, in relation to the establishment
of an anti-corruption agency, it was argued that the EU has met resistance
“every step of the way” and that, while there was some evidence of implemen-
tation, the process had been slow and devoid of any real substance:
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when the agency first opened, it took a long time to agree the legislation that
opened it. Once it opened, it was given premises that weren’t really suitable;
they still today, four years on, live inside a building that doesn’t have the
capacity to hold the staff required to manage it. They’re not given the tools
to do the job. So, the resistance is continuous, even though for the last four
years the EU has had permanent advisors inside the anti-corruption agency.
(Interview #13)
Another signiﬁcant example of the simulation of reforms relates to the case of
defense reform. In this case, NATO and theHigh Representative took a leading
role in defensematters through the launching of the Defence ReformCommis-
sion in 2002, whereas the EU has supported defense reform by providing
capacity-building through EUFOR Althea. While defense reform was often
considered a successful case (see Aybet & Bieber, 2011; Berg, 2014), in recent
years progress has stalled. Moreover, while opposition to police reform has
been more overt, resistance to defense reform was mostly hidden, yet it has
become more overt in recent years. On paper, the Bosnian army was uniﬁed
after the defense reform negotiations that led to the abolishment of the entity
armed forces and the creation of a new state-level Ministry of Defence and a
joint command structure. Yet, this agreementwas only possible bymaintaining
ethnically homogeneous brigades and mono-ethnic regiments, and by preser-
ving an ethnic balance in terms of appointments.
Over the last few years, however, the defense reforms remain stalled
because of the lack of resolution of the dispute over the ownership of
defense property. One of the key requirements of NATO’s Membership
Action Plan is that all immovable defense property such as barracks or ware-
houses should be registered at the state (rather than entity) level. European
Commission reports have also referred to the need to achieve progress in
the implementation of the defense reforms, particularly in relation to
defense property (European Commission, 2016, p. 75). However, so far,
Republika Srpska has not complied with this condition. Moreover, there is
evidence that some of the reforms are being rolled back, with an increasing
politicization of the army ranks: officers being more closely connected with
ethnic parties, people making more public shows of religiosity in order to
gain career favors, and more ethnic segregation in the army. According to a
recent assessment “there is no expectation that the [Bosnian army] will gen-
erate destabilization or initiate inter-ethnic violence. But there is almost uni-
versal belief that in the event of such violence, it would collapse along its
ethnic fault lines” (Bassuener, 2015, p. ii).
References to politicians “dragging their feet” or paying lip service to par-
ticular reforms were also mentioned by other interviewees and in relation to
other issues (war crimes, judicial reform, freedom of the press, human rights,
etc.). One interviewee (#5) went as far as saying: “Bosnia and Herzegovina is
almost the Somalia of Europe. The country has grown becoming reliant on,
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and playing, the international community.” These examples show how pro-
gress in this area has become “pure speculation” to paraphrase Malmvig
(2014, p. 306). While Bosnia is still committed to the reform agenda put
forward by the EU and NATO, local parties have maintained this illusion
by “pretending” to reform or by introducing some measures in some areas,
while stalling or rolling back reforms in other sectors.
Lowering the bar
Finally, the case of Bosnia also shows how the locals have been able to work
within the EU’s discourses to “lower the bar,” that is, to modify and lower
the conditions set by EU policy-makers. This strategy draws on some of the
features of EU governmentality discussed above; first, the fact that some of
the European principles in the area of SSR are unspecified and vague and, as
such, there is room to mold these criteria to adapt them to a particular
context or reality. This also follows from the notion of local ownership
and the need to incorporate local needs into the process, which challenges
the idea of strict conditionality as it is usually understood in other policy
areas. Finally, the idea of gradualism also allows for the locals to be able
to shape and adapt conditions in order to ensure “progress” is made.
Hence, as summarized by Beirević and Ćehajić (2013), in the case of
Bosnia, we see
a systematic lowering of the bar on the part of the international community,
with a “carrot and stick” approach that more often than not settled on offering
the carrot, or a reward, showed local counterparts that achieving less than was
originally asked of them was not a problem. (p. 47)
In relation to the police reform, this “backtracking” (Vandemoortele, 2012,
p. 211) resulted in the watering down of the three European principles in
the ﬁnal agreement of October 2007. This agreement only envisaged the estab-
lishment of some coordinating police bodies at the state level (e.g., Directorate
for Coordination of Police Bodies of Bosnia and Herzegovina), while the
overall reorganization of the Bosnian police forces at the entity level was post-
poned until a constitutional reform could be agreed upon. EU policy-makers
accepted this agreement and allowed Bosnia to sign the SAA with the EU the
following year.
In this case, the strategy of the Bosnian Serbs was one of “wait and see” as
they believed that the EU and the High Representative would be unable to
defend the three principles and would eventually lower the conditions (Lind-
vall, 2009, pp. 231–232). There were two reasons to believe this. Firstly,
Bosnian Serb officials thought the EU position to be inconsistent and variable
over time. In the words of one of the interviewees (#16),
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we had to agree the police reform to sign the SAA, and we had three principles
to follow. Then the international community changed their stance in the pol-
itical level negotiations. We didn’t fulfill these three principles… but the
SAA was given to us to sign anyway. They just asked for positive efforts to
be made towards the unification of the police… . What the EU gives to
[Bosnia] is always modified, or [things are] not done as they are supposed to.
Secondly, some local politicians also understood that security and political
considerations were more important to the EU than the fulﬁllment of Euro-
pean standards. EU threats that Bosnia would be isolated or would not pro-
gress towards enlargement were simply not credible as local politicians
were well aware of how important Bosnia’s peace and stability are for EU
member states.
Obviously, the lowering of the bar has broader effects beyond the specific
reform that the EU is dealing with at a particular time undermining the EU’s
governmentality. In particular, lowering the bar undermines the credibility
and effectiveness of EU conditionality in the medium and the long term.
As a Bosnian official pointed out in 2008, with regard to the protracted
reform negotiations:
It was very unwise of the EU to first set the bar so high but then to constantly
lower it. This has created a very bad atmosphere in the [Republika Srpska],
where politicians are convinced that many EU conditions can be diluted in
the course of the pre-accession process. (As cited in Tolksdorf, 2014, p. 69)
Hence, it is not surprising to find similar dynamics of “wait and see” in
order to achieve the relaxation of conditionality in other areas. For instance,
one interviewee (#9) argued that EU conditions are “never implemented as-
is,” but that they are “always modified” and that in the case of EU accession
and trade, “that part was modified so extensively that the EU didn’t really get
what it wanted in the first place.” In the case of the implementation of the
recently agreed Reform Agenda, because of lack of agreement between the
local parties, rather than focusing on the original priorities, the EU ended
up spending the money on cross-border collaboration projects, which accord-
ing to one interviewee (#5) “everyone likes, so actually they won by resisting.”
Yet, the EU’s governmentality has also adapted to these forms of counter-
conduct. One way has been by developing what an EU official (interview #13)
refers to as “minimum standards,” that is, the EU will accept different laws by
each legislature within the country on a particular issue as long as they respect
some minimum standards the EU sets. In other words,
inside a country where you’ve got effectively 16 different legislatures, not all of
them want to do it the same way… . So, we look at something like asset seizure,
asset recovery: It’s difficult to get all 16 legislatures to agree to doing it in the
same way. We have said that, so long as they get to these minimum standards,
we’ll accept that. We have done the same with firearms legislation, [and] traf-
ficking of human beings. We have found a middle ground. And it hasn’t
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lessened the standard; it’s just accepted that they can all do it in different ways,
so long as they get to that benchmark. (Interview #13)
Secondly, another consequence of the resistance that the EU has encountered in
Bosnia has been an increasing degree of technocratization of the EU’s govern-
mentality in Bosnia, particularly since the failure of the police reform (Vande-
moortele, 2012, p. 212). For instance, one interviewee (#14) mentioned the
example of the structural dialogue in the justice sector, which was resisted by
Republika Srpska. As a result, according to the interviewee, the conclusions
and recommendation from the structural dialogue were “so big that you
couldn’t follow them at all.” Instead of addressing key legal and political
obstacles, “they switched to very technical details because they found that they
could not implement anything, and rather than saying that they could
not implement they just go into these technical details.”These two formsof adap-
tation show how counter-conducts might end up reinforcing EU
governmentality.
Conclusion
While the literature on SSR has largely adopted a top-down focus in examin-
ing the strategies and practices of international donors, this article contends
that there is a need to explore how these strategies are received and often
resisted by those that seek to govern. This article has shown that while SSR
can be seen as a form of neoliberal governmentality, there is still space for
resistance by those who refuse to be governed “like that.”
In the case of SSR in Bosnia, the article has provided insights into how the
locals have resisted EU governmentality by examining the failures and sites of
contestation resulting from EU intervention in SSR in Bosnia. Specifically, this
article has identified four expressions of counter-conduct which are visible in
the field of SSR: upholding European standards, using the local ownership
trap, simulating reforms, and lowering the bar. There are also other forms
of overt and hidden resistance, including reluctance to share documents
and information on time, or lack of cooperation in response to certain
measures perceived as strengthening state-level agencies, including the har-
monization of legislation (Fréjabue, 2013, p. 36). Yet, the four forms of
counter-conduct identified in this article are paradigmatic in so far as they
rely on the discourses of European values, local ownership, and gradualism
that underpin EU SSR rationality.
Secondly, the case discussed here also provides evidence of the paradoxical
nature of resistance. The different dimensions of local counter-conducts
worked to both undermine and reinforce sedimented power relationships. In
order to resist EU demands, Bosnian elites had to frame their arguments in a
manner that was in line with dominant regimes of knowledge and, by doing
so, they have reinforced EU governmentality. While the issue of NATO
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membership might appear to be more controversial, EU membership and EU
principles were not questioned. Similarly, Bosnian elites did not question the
techniques of EU governmentality (e.g., benchmarking on the basis of EU cri-
teria, monitoring by the European Commission, or mentoring by the EUPM).
What they often questioned was the fact that the EU had not applied this in a
“fair” or consistent manner, that is, it was about how not to be governed like
that. This illuminates the fact that while local efforts to resist EU SSR have
undoubtedly undermined EU peacebuilding efforts in Bosnia, some of these
counter-conducts do in fact strengthen and legitimize EU SSR governmentality.
The empirical evidence also showed some instances where the EU tech-
niques of power have been adapted as a result of local resistance. These
include establishing minimum standards, increasing the technical character
of the reforms, or moving to a discourse of “good practices.” Again, this pro-
vides evidence of the complex nature of power relations in post-conflict
societies and echoes some of the insights from the peacebuilding literature
on hybrid peace (Mac Ginty, 2011; Richmond, 2010). EU SSR in Bosnia is
thus highly complex and its outcomes are a mixture of conditionality, resist-
ance, and adaptation both of the peacebuilding project and local strategies.
In sum, the purpose of the article is not grand theorizing or devising an over-
arching theory of SSR interventions, but to render visible local discourses and
practices that remain invisible in EUpeacebuilding interventions.A Foucauldian
approach to resistance helps uncover relations of power and variable and contin-
gent forms of resistance that take place within prevailing forms of governmental-
ity.While one should not expect to see the exact same types of counter-conducts
in other cases, yet the rationality of these counter-conducts might be similar
across other EU SSR interventions. In this sense, the article might also help
inform further research into EU peacebuilding. This Foucauldian approach
also underlines the complex nature of power relations in peacebuilding settings,
where resistance challenges but also reinforces domineering power. Finally, and
most importantly, this perspective allows us tomove beyond binary understand-
ings of (international) power and (local) resistance in peacebuilding practices.
Note
1. The use of SSR programs is not restricted to post-conflict situations; they have
also been launched in other developing and transitional countries to reform and
strengthen the capacities of security institutions (Ansorg, 2017; Dursun-
Ozkanca & Vandemoortele, 2012).
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